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SUMMARY 
The distinction between the findings made at a bench trial and the findings made 
from a jury trial matter when reviewing a sufficiency challenge on appeal. Under the 
clearly erroneous standard applicable to this case, it is less difficult for the Appellant to 
meet his burden of demonstrating the trial court's finding was against the clear weight of 
the evidence. Appellant maintains, as outlined in his opening brief, that the evidence 
presented by the state at trial was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) 
he knew that his conduct of stabbing Daniel in the thigh with a small knife created a 
substantial risk of death; (2) he consciously disregarded that risk; and, (3) the risk was a 
type that an ordinary person would not have failed to recognize. Because Appellant's 
sufficiency argument on appeal does not rely on assertions that he was not the individual 
who committed the offense, detailed analysis of the transcript of his confession was 
unnecessary as those "facts" were presented at trial. Finally, Appellant's sufficiency 
argument was preserved below and the invited error doctrine is inapplicable 
POINT. APPELLANT HAS PROPERLY MARSHALLED THE EVIDENCE 
UNDER THE LESS EXACTING CLEARLY ERRONEOUS STANDARD TO 
SHOW THAT THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THAT 
APPELLANT HAD THE REQUISITE INTENT TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION 
FOR RECKLESS MANSLAUGHTER. 
Because it is less difficult for an Appellant "to demonstrate that the evidence [at a 
bench trial] . . . is so wanting as to be 'clearly erroneous'" when the standard of proof is 
the "more exacting evidentiary standard" of beyond a reasonable doubt, the Appellant has 
met his burden of showing that his conviction for manslaughter was against the clear 
weight of the evidence. In re Z.D., 2006 UT 54, flO, 147 P.3d 401. Under the clearly 
erroneous standard, this Court's power in reviewing sufficiency claims is not as limited 
as it is with jury trials. Id.; State v. Rudolph, 2000 UT App 155, ^ 22, 3 P.3d 192. When 
reviewing a jury trial verdict, this Court will only reverse 
after viewing the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light 
most favorable to the verdict, [it] find[s] that "the evidence to support the 
[jury] verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as 
to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust." 
Rudolph, 2000 UT App 155 at TJ22 (citation omitted). 
By contrast, the Supreme Court has made it clear when reviewing the evidence 
from a bench trial, the evidence is not viewed in a light "most favorable to the appellee" 
nor is the appellee "given the benefit of all favorable inferences." In re Z.D., 2006 UT 54 
at YP2-3 5. Instead, while "scrutiny of the district judge's findings of fact . . . is 
deferential,... it is not abject. . . . [This Court] need not, to overturn a finding under the 
clear-error standard, adjudge the finding cso unlikely that no reasonable person would 
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find it to be true.5" Id at *|34 (quotation and citation omitted). The decision to overturn 
will stem from "review of the 'whole record"5 and consideration of the "heightened 
standards of proof.55 Id. at [^37. Overturning findings as clearly erroneous is required in 
cases where "although there is evidence to support it" (Id. at *P8), the appellate court is 
left with "a firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been made.'5 Id at [^40. 
As argued in Appellant's opening brief, the trial court's finding of reckless 
manslaughter was against the clear weight of the evidence presented by the state. See 
Appellant Opening Brief 18-25. Appellant's sufficiency argument on appeal does not 
rely on assertions that he was not the individual who committed the offense or that the 
police officers' failed to render medical help to Daniel as he bled profusely. Because 
Appellant's "confession" presented at trial only went to the issue of whether he was 
actually the perpetrator of this offense and not to his objective and subjective intent if he 
was, detailed analysis of the transcript is unnecessary in determining whether there was 
sufficient evidence. All the relevant facts surrounding the event and going to Appellant's 
intent were present at trial through testimony. Instead, Appellant's argument relies on 
whether the clear weight of the evidence established that he possessed the required intent. 
Appellant maintains that the facts as established at trial fail to support a finding beyond a 
reasonable doubt that he recklessly caused the death of Daniel.l See Appellant's 
1
 The State correctly points out that references in the Appellant's opening brief to the 
preliminary hearing are not proper for the court to consider when reviewing whether 
there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction. See Appellee's Brief 23. 
However, most of the references are supported by the evidence presented at trial. 
Assertions made by Appellant, references to time before medical attention was given and 
blood squirting from Daniel's leg, not found in the trial transcript do not bear on whether 
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Opening Brief 14-25. Specifically, the state failed to prove under the narrow definition 
of "reckless" as set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(3) (2003), that Appellant actually 
knew that his conduct of sticking a small knife into Daniel's thigh created a "substantial 
and unjustifiable risk of death" (State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 263 (Utah 1988)), and 
he "consciously disregarded" the risk. State v. Robinson, 2003 UT App 1, ^ J6, 63 P.3d 
105. 
References in Appellant's opening brief to the officers' lack of medical 
intervention simply add further support to Appellant's lack of intent argument in that an 
ordinary person would not perceive that a stab wound to the thigh with a small knife 
creates a substantial risk of death. See State v. Wessendorf, 777 P.2d 523, 526 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989) (objective component of criminal recklessness requires the magnitude of the 
risk of death "be of such a degree that an ordinary person would not disregard or fail to 
recognize it"); Robinson, 2003 UT App 1 at [^6 n.2 ("the determination to be made is 
whether the defendant was subjectively 'aware of but consciously disregarded' the risk 
his actions posed."). And while the state suggests that it is not required to prove that 
Appellant "knew of the exact location of the artery," to prove recklessness, it was 
required to prove "actual knowledge or awareness" that his act created a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk of death and that the risk was "of such a degree that an ordinary person 
would not disregard or fail to recognize it." Id. at *jf6 (citations omitted). The evidence 
does not bear this out. 
there was sufficient evidence to support that he had the requisite intent to support a 
conviction of reckless manslaughter. 
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Specifically, as argued in Appellant's opening brief, the medical examiner's 
testimony supports Appellant's assertion that under normal circumstances, sticking a 
small knife into the thigh of a healthy male individual is not ordinarily considered a 
substantial risk of death. For example, the medical examiner testified that Daniel "had 
died as a result of exsanguination, in other words bleeding to death, resulting from a stab 
wound of the left leg." R. 201:94. The depth of the stab wound was "three and a half 
inches. And what it struck was a major branch of the femoral artery, which is the main 
artery which provides blood to the leg." R. 201:97. The artery was not severed all the 
way through, "[i]t was a partial transaction. That's actually a little more dangerous of an 
injury than a complete cut." R. 201:102. "Arteries are elastic, so they are under some 
degree of tension. So if you cut it completely there is going to be a pulling back and 
somewhat of a self sealing of the artery. If you only cut it partially that pulling back and 
self sealing cannot occur, so it will bleed more copiously." R. 201:102. "Once an artery 
is cut, it will with every pulse of the heart, every beat of the heart, continue to leak blood 
until it is either closed, sutured, tied off." R. 201:97. 
Defense counsel: With a wound similar to the one you saw here, how long 
would it take to bleed out? 
Medical Examiner: I can't say with certainty. It would not be an 
immediately lethal injury. It would not be putting out huge amounts of 
blood. Predicting how long it would take, I can't do. But it would be a 
slowly evolving problem. 
Defense counsel: It would take a number of minutes? 
Medical Examiner: At least. 
Defense counsel: And if appropriate first aid had been applied, to a 
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reasonable degree of medical certainty, is it likely that he would have lived? 
Medical Examiner: The sooner this individual received adequate care, the 
greater the likelihood he would have survived, yes. 
Defense counsel: Hypothetically, if the evidence shows that 911 was called 
from the residence at nine minutes after 5:00, and that emergency medical 
help did not arrive until 5:15, would continued bleeding during that six-
minute period be significant towards this person's prospects for living? 
Medical Examiner: It would certainly have contributed to the deterioration 
in their condition, yes, if no pressure, tourniquet, any other methodologies 
of trying to slow down the bleeding had been applied. 
Defense counsel: And it is your testimony that with this type of injury it is 
not the type that's going to stop on its own? 
Medical Examiner: Very unlikely that this would self correct. 
Defense counsel: Whereas, with a number of less-serious cuts, clotting will 
occur and, eventually, if they are not too serious, they will stop on their 
own? 
Medical Examiner: Yes. 
Defense counsel: But this one definitely required intervention? 
Medical Examiner: Yes. 
R. 201:105-06. 
Defense counsel: Physiologically, did the vascular system on Daniel 
Johnson appear otherwise normal, other than this injury? 
Medical Examiner: Yes. 
Defense counsel: First aid should have worked on him, as it generally does 
with an average person? 
Medical Examiner: First aid - -
Defense counsel: In terms of stopping the bleeding? 
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Medical Examiner: First aid would have certainly retarded the progression 
of his demise. 
R. 201:108 
On redirect, the medical examiner reiterated the effects of delayed medical 
intervention. 
Prosecutor: With regard to the questions that [defense counsel] asked you, 
regarding treatment and proximity of treatment to injury, you indicated that 
the six-minute delay approximately between the 911 call and treatment 
could have been significant? 
Medical Examiner: I said it would certainly play a role. 
Prosecutor: Is that significance lessened or diminished in any way if those 
are minutes 13 to 19 following injury, as opposed to minutes one through 
six following injury? 
Medical Examiner: Minutes 13 through 19 is when this person is becoming 
more and more irreversibly damaged. Minutes one through six probably 
aren't as crucial in terms of the irreversibility of the damage that they have 
sustained. 
Prosecutor: But the 13 minutes it took to call 911 could have been just as 
damaging? 
Medical Examiner: Certainly, if there is a - the longer the period of time 
before that six minutes, the more dangerous the situation. 
R. 201:110-11. 
The medical examiner's testimony supports Appellant's claim that this was a 
unique type of wound because the artery which happens to flow through this leg was only 
partially transected. Had it been completely transected a type of self-sealing would have 
occurred presumptively preventing it from continuing to bleed. There was no evidence 
presented that the Appellant had actual knowledge that a major artery flows through this 
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leg and that by sticking a small knife in the thigh the artery could be partially transected 
preventing it from self-sealing. Without a showing of the subjective elements of "actual 
knowledge or awareness" and a conscious disregard by Appellant of this risk, Appellant 
cannot be held liable for criminal recklessness. State v. Martinez, 2000 UT App 320, 
1fl2, n.5, 14 P.3d 114, affd State v. Martinez, 2002 UT 80, 52 P.3d 1276; see also State 
v. Howard, 597 P.2d 878, 881 (Utah 1979) (difference between recklessness and criminal 
negligence is whether defendant "was aware, but consciously disregarded a substantial 
risk" for recklessness; and whether defendant "was unaware but ought to have been 
aware of a substantial risk" for negligence). 
Finally, the record does not support the state's claim that Appellant's argument is 
either unpreserved or was invited error. See Appellee Brief 27-36. A claim is preserved 
for appeal when it has been raised and the trial court has been "given an opportunity to 
address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 
^}11, 10 P.3d 346 (quotations and citations omitted). The preservation rule not only allows 
the trial court an opportunity to correct the alleged error but also prevents a defendant 
from "forgo[ing] . . . an objection with the strategy of 'enhancing] the defendant's 
chances of acquittal and then, if that strategy fails,. . . claiming] on appeal that the Court 
should reverse.'" Id. (quotations and citations omitted). Similarly, the "invited error 
doctrine arises from the principle that a party cannot take advantage of an error 
committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the error." Pratt v. 
Nelson, 2007 UT 41, fl7, 164 P.3d 366. 
The state claims that defense counsel conceded that "the State's evidence, if 
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believed, was sufficient lo establish murder." Appellee Brief 28. In addition, the state 
argues that Appellant is claiming the evidence supports a finding of negligent homicide 
rather than reckless manslaughter and thai this argumciii r • ;>• eserved. See Appellee 
Briet a:v I lowcvei , Appellani lus never asserted that the evidence supports a iinding of 
negliger? "-•• •-• licide but has consistently argued that the evidence was insufficient to 
support a finding of recklessness as that term is ucnneu v..:n bee iicnera. i'•• 
Appellant's opening nnei. KCK-! < - .eg!i.;e!?-': -i- i Je were only used to provide 
I lie - . • ' * - ciiuii uclvvccn "actual awareness" of the risk created by the 
conduct required for recklessness and unawareness but *\lu>Lij 
risk, required for criminal negligence. Appellant's opening hurl* 14-1 /, Therefore, no 
preservation problem exists 'ej-ardiiig Appellant's sufficiency argume^i In aAiition, as 
the following excerpt from the transcript shows, the state misunderstands dele te 
counsel's argument and, therefore, the invited eiTui doeli nie n also inuppli* able, 
• • During opening argument, defense coi msel argued that if the trial court believed 
thai ;\ppellaii! slabbed Daniel then this act would be homicide by assault. R, 201:24, 
The prosecutor in closing argued against the trial court's considerai i. •. , :»k. r i< i-
by assault or reckless manslaughlei. R 'li I ,.* I K .V . lining closing, defense 
counsel again reiterated his argument that Appellant was not guilty of the offense but 
"[i]f the Court does find that he is responsible the maximum he is gum;, ol is 
homicide by assault," R. . ; . . 4 . ,, . .-. .•: •,.,.. .». *. K.*;.a* - bating 
m terms oi* iinding Kuui Lairinc ^mi; of this offense, I see it as the Court 
having two possible ways of gel ting there, (hie i.-> to believe that lie 
confessed to the officers that he stabbed Daniel Johnson, The other is to 
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believe Chelsea Stout and her testimony that that is what she saw. 
R. 201:224-225. 
Defense counsel then proceeded to address why there was not believable evidence 
to support either of these "possible ways.5' R. 201:224-233. The state construes defense 
counsel's argument as invited error. See Appellee's Brief 27-31. The state's argument 
fails to recognize that defense counsel was setting up his argument so as to counter that 
there was believable evidence regarding the elements of murder. Furthermore, the trial 
court did not accept the state's theory that Appellant possessed the requisite intent to 
support a finding of first degree murder. R. 201:265. Therefore, the only issue before 
this Court is whether there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that Appellant 
"acted recklessly, as that term is defined by the Utah criminal code, and that he recklessly 
caused the death of Daniel Johnson." R. 201:265. Viewing the relevant portions of 
defense counsel's argument in context further supports that no concession was made 
regarding Appellant's mental state. After countering the state's theory that there was 
believable evidence to support a murder conviction, defense counsel argued the 
following: 
Homicide by assault, and I would point out to the Court that an aggravated 
assault is an assault. It absolutely meets the definition of homicide by 
assault. 
A knife wound generally isn't fatal. There are exceptions. Stab somebody 
in the throat or neck, boom, serious problems. Stab somebody in the heart, 
boom, serious problems. Stab somebody elsewhere in the chest, we are 
down a level, still extremely threatening, a serious problem, but not as 
immediately life threatening as a neck or a heart wound. 
Stab somebody in the thigh, what's supposed to happen with that? It is 
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supposed to hurt. It is supposed to bleed a little bii. They are supposed to 
get a couple of stitches. They are supposed to be okay 
What happened in this case, convergence of two neee^ary things. Number 
one, it was a very unique wound, partially transecting the artery. If it had 
missed the artery, no problem, . . ., go get a couple of stitches, good to go. 
If it had completely transected the artery, again, the artery would pinch off 
itself . . . It is this unique type of wound, number one. 
Number two, lack of first aid 
, And when someone stabs someone in the i-cg, iney are not expecting, 
hey, I am going to get lucky and partially transect a major branch of the 
f l o r a l artery, and then maybe the guy won't get first aid and I might get 
1
 v and eel a kill. That's not the thought process.... 
!l is nut iiv intent io try to kill. You try to kill, throat, enesL, ui mulupic. 
again and again and again and again, cases where we have < v °0 V) stnb 
wounds, yeah, there V-MS Iwe e^ V* intmi M U evident. 
11 the uouri LUKW- that Raul Carrillo is responsible for this, what lex el o? 
offense should he be guilty of? You saw the interview there. I think it i-
clear from thai he nc\cr intended In kill anybody. . . . The nature, the 
location of the wound. I .owcr thigh. That's not where you go to kill 
somebody doesn't have the iment. to cause serious bodilv ininry. 
If the Court o< ^ v(; i .i^, mat argument and finds that there is the intent to 
do serious bodilv iniurv here, I would submit the most we can get is 
manslaughter. . . . 
I would submit the wound, the location, tnai mere is only one, indicates 
only an intent to cause bodily injury. There ^ no intent to cause something 
life threatening. In the ordhv»n < ,^nr^ - tins wouldn't be a life-
threatening woi md. 
In sum, I would ask . . . the Court to find Raul Carrillo not guilty, i) :* e 
Court does find that he is responsible, I would suggest that the mn;.ir,: ic 
is guilt}' of is homicide by assault. 
•. > 
None of defense counsel's closing arguments can be considered a "concession 
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omission[] . . . bar[ring] consideration of the claim." See Appellee Brief 33. Instead, 
defense counsel's argument consistently has been that Appellant is not guilty of this 
offense but if the Court does find that he stabbed Daniel then the evidence at most shows 
that his intent was to only cause bodily injury. Thus Appellant's insufficient evidence 
argument was preserved and the invited error doctrine does not apply. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above and more fully set out in Appellant's opening brief, 
Carrillo respectfully requests this Court to reverse his conviction for reckless 
manslaughter. 
SUBMITTED this _ [ 5 ^ day of September, 2007. 
X^ • 
DEBRA M. NELSON 
MARIE MAXWELL 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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